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Ausdruck und Eindruck: Zum chinesischen Verständnis der Sinne. By Irmgard 
 Enzinger, Lun Wen—Studien zur Geistesgeschichte und Literatur in China, 
vol. 10. Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 2007. 364 pp. ISBN 978-3-447-05456-0 (pb)
“... doch gibt es einen Parallelismus zwischen den ‘5 Eingeweiden’ (Lungen, 
Niere, Galle, Leber, Milz) als ‘inneren’ und den 5 Sinnen als ‘äußeren Regulato-
ren’” (... there exists, however, a parallelism between the ‘ﬁ ve viscera’ [lungs, kid-
neys, gall, liver, spleen] as ‘inward’ and the 5 senses as ‘outward regulators’). 
It is against the depiction of the Chinese concept of the senses in passages like 
this one, found in Eckart Scheerer’s article on the senses in the Historisches Wör-
terbuch der Philosophie (vol. 9, 1995, p. 827), and in the sources of this article—
Alfred Forke (Geschichte der alten chinesischen Philosophie, 1927), Feng Yu-lan/
Bodde (History of Chinese Philosophy, 1952) and Joseph Needham (Science and 
Civilization in China, vol. 2, 1956)—that Irmgard Enzinger’s book is written. 
Enzinger thus starts her book with a critique of the insuﬃ  ciency of the sinological 
research on Chinese conceptions of what in the West is commonly understood as 
the ﬁ ve senses (eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin), quoting selected passages from 
Western writings on Chinese philosophy and medicine. In this introductory 
critical survey the author does not attempt to explain such Western (mis-)concep-
tions in the broader context of a history of the adoption of ideas; they are rather 
taken as a starting point into an investigation which in turn chooses to focus on 
traditional Chinese primary sources to provide the many non-sinological, but also 
the sinological, readers with new and more adequate insights into Chinese tradi-
tional concepts of the senses. In the author’s view Chinese traditional thought 
does not separate the senses from the mind but instead assumes a unity of dual 
concepts and a complementarity of oppositions, for example a unity of thought 
and feeling that only recently has become an attractive modern concept in the 
West. 
From this Chinese perspective Enzinger tries to gain some inspiration and new 
unexpected views on the topic of the senses. Since many of the more inﬂ uential 
writers on the Chinese senses are scholars trained in Western medicine or phi-
losophy, not sinologists, and thus have to base their knowledge of Chinese body 
concepts on sinological sources, she considers it an important task for sinologists 
to provide these readers with sound information based on detailed research into 
Chinese primary sources. A ﬁ rst step in that direction, according to her, has been 
taken by Jane Geaney with her book On the Epistemology of the Senses in Early 
Chinese  ought.1 Since, however, in Enzinger’s view Geaney’s analysis is still too 
much focused on the Western concept of the senses, she attempts to take the 
consequent step of a more radical investigation into the diversity and divergent 
conceptualizations in existence in a ﬁ eld that in many aspects exceeds the limits 
of our Western deﬁ nition of “the senses”. 
1) Honolulu, University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002.
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 e book is divided into three parts.  e ﬁ rst part (pp. 19-101) explores two 
central Chinese traditional expressions for what is called the “ﬁ ve senses” in the 
West: “Five Oﬃ  cers” (wu guan) and “Seven Oriﬁ ces” (qi qiao).  ese expressions 
are analyzed in diﬀ erent discursive contexts, starting from their earliest occur-
rences in pre-Qin times.  e discussion of the wu guan reﬂ ects the relevance of 
the semantics of the number ﬁ ve as well as of the term guan (oﬃ  cial) for an 
understanding of this concept. It introduces to the correlative thought of the Five 
Phases (wu xing), takes into account the concept of the Five Concerns (wu shi) in 
the “Hongfan” chapter of the Shangshu, and shows the relation of these early 
concepts to the concept of the wu guan. In contrast to the idea of Seven Oriﬁ ces, 
which appears for the ﬁ rst time in the Zhuangzi and refers to the facial oriﬁ ces of 
the senses only, the concept of Five Oﬃ  cers is associated with the human body as 
a whole and can also be related to the administrative realm. Further relations to 
other realms are explored in this ﬁ rst part of the book, so that the concepts are 
discussed within the diﬀ erent connotative entanglements of such diﬀ erent ﬁ elds 
as epistemology, moral philosophy, physiognomy, medicine, qi-theories, geo-
mancy, military strategy, divination, ritual, astronomy, astrology and numerology, 
with their respective historical and theoretical contexts.  e analysis is entirely 
based on the central passages in early primary sources that make use of the expres-
sions under discussion. It owes its strength to the combination of a clear histori-
cal perspective on the sources, for which the author always tries to provide dates 
and discursive contexts, and a constant attempt to relate the passages to one 
another, ﬁ nd a common meaning, and deﬁ ne a semantic ﬁ eld for the expression 
under consideration that might also shed some light on the understanding of the 
ﬁ ve senses in a critical reﬂ ection on the European terminology. I do not know of 
any other introduction to the terms “Five Oﬃ  cers” and “Seven Oriﬁ ces”, espe-
cially in their early usage, of comparable historical profoundness, interpretative 
clearness, complexity of sources and academic thoroughness. Short summaries at 
the end of each part are very helpful for the reader to recall the results before 
proceeding to the next ﬁ eld of investigation. 
Yet, a few critical remarks need to be added. Some of the interpretative deci-
sions are not entirely intelligible. First of all, is it sensible to base an analysis of 
the Chinese understanding of the human senses on two linguistic expressions and 
proceed in a rather philological way to explore all the diﬀ erent contextual usages 
and connotations of these expressions, and then draw conclusions on the Chinese 
understanding of the human senses in general? If in Enzinger’s view Geaney’s 
approach is too much focused on the Western concept of the senses, then her own 
approach submits, and thereby limits, itself entirely to these two linguistic expres-
sions and hence curtails her analysis of the linguistic richness of concepts, notions, 
terms and expressions which also relate to, and are used to talk about, the senses, 
as Geaney’s book shows more clearly, and which she sacriﬁ ces in favour of two 
historically quite inconsistent philosophical notions. Second, the selection of the 
adduced passages is not explained.  ere is no critical reﬂ ection about how 
 comprehensive the selection of the chosen passages is, or in which respect they 
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are relevant and crucial for the analysis of the two concepts involved.  ird, 
although Foucault’s discourse theory is mentioned as an important methodo-
logical device in the introduction (p. 17), the interpretation of the passages does 
not analyse them as discourses but in most cases tries to give the “real” meaning 
of the analysed concept. 
 e second part (pp. 103-177) starts with a reﬂ ection on the ﬁ rst point of the 
critique above and thereby explains its own entirely diﬀ erent approach to the 
Chinese understanding of the human senses.  is second part proceeds to look 
at the entries that concern the individual sense organs listed under the broader 
categories “humans” and “human aﬀ airs” in two important encyclopaedias 
(leishu), the Yiwen leiju and the Taiping yulan.  e fact that the senses listed in 
both leishu are not consistent either with the “Five Oﬃ  cers” or with the “Seven 
Oriﬁ ces”, not even in their numbers (four and six), clearly reveals that the two 
concepts analysed in the ﬁ rst part of the book cannot be taken as representative, 
perhaps not even as very important, regarding the Chinese understanding of the 
human senses.  is contradiction, however, is not explored critically by the 
author, and the selection of these two new starting points for a new analysis, 
going in great detail through all the entries and again trying to ﬁ nd a common 
ground of meaning through an intelligent interpretation of the passages involved, 
encounters the same methodological problems as the selection of the two expres-
sions discussed in the ﬁ rst part. 
Enzinger explains that, instead of randomly analyzing whatever kind of classi-
cal Chinese texts on the senses, she prefers to look at selections of such texts made 
by Chinese philologists in the early Tang and early Song. Although this decision 
is sensible in terms of saving work and gaining a further Chinese discourse per-
spective, the question again arises of why the author decided to chose these par-
ticular leishu among so many others, and which new particular set of discourses 
we are dealing with here, and why. Enzinger claims that she chose the Yiwen leiju 
because it is historically the ﬁ rst leishu and therefore provides a lot of informative 
material.  e Taiping Yulan in turn qualiﬁ es as a second source for comparison 
because, in a sequence of rather heterogeneous leishu, it can be seen as the direct 
follower of the Yiwen leiju (p. 12). When the aim is to explore the Chinese under-
standing of human senses, however, the question should rather be which leishu 
can be taken as the most representative for a general and broad understanding of 
the senses, since it cannot be assumed that this is necessarily the case of the oldest 
ones. Enzinger is aware of the fact that leishu material reﬂ ects neither popular, 
local and oral traditions nor the important Buddhist and Daoist concepts of the 
human body and senses. She is convinced, however, that the material under inves-
tigation is relevant enough to reﬂ ect basic lines of the Chinese discourse on the 
senses (pp. 15-16). 
Yet she does not inform the reader that, for example, the senses in the Taiping 
yulan are classiﬁ ed within the larger category of the human body, where the 
sequence merely follows the line from the head downwards, and that the senses 
do not form a distinct group but are only parts of a rather descriptive sequence 
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of the human head—crown, forehead, face, eyebrows, ear, eye, cheeks, nose, nose 
bridge, mouth, tongue, lips, grinder, incisor, and so forth.  is calls into question 
the relevance of the eyebrows as one of the crucial senses.  e only reason for 
including them in the analysis is the fact that from the tenth century A.D. they 
are mentioned in physiognomic works as one of the Five Oﬃ  cers. But the func-
tion of the physiognomic oﬃ  cers is entirely an expressive one, it does not have 
any receptive aspect, which again is crucial for any deﬁ nition of the senses in the 
Western discourse.  e fact that the Yiwen leiju has no entry on the eyebrows and 
that in the Taiping yulan the eyebrows are listed in a sequence together with fore-
head, cheeks, lips and teeth does not support the argument that the eyebrows 
should be taken into consideration when the Chinese understanding of the senses 
is discussed. If the eyebrows are brought into the discussion of senses because they 
are mentioned in late physiognomic works as one of the Five Oﬃ  cers, then the 
heart and body should also be taken into consideration since the Mengzi and 
Xunzi both mention the heart (pp. 47, 52), and the Xunzi also the body (p. 48), 
as one of the Five Oﬃ  cers. Jane Geaney, for her part, regards the heart as one of 
the major players in ancient Chinese sensorial epistemology. 
 ese problems reﬂ ect the more general one of equalizing the Western concept 
of the Five Senses with the Chinese concept of the Five Oﬃ  cers. Following the 
length of the entries on the “Oﬃ  cials” in the two leishu: eyes, ears, mouth, tongue 
(listed in both leishu), nose, and eyebrows (listed only in the Taiping yulan), 
 Enzinger structures her second part according to these six “senses”. At the begin-
ning of each sub-part of the second chapter she ﬁ rst gives a summary of the 
characterisations of the individual sense considered and of the main features, 
aspects, meanings and functions associated with it in both leishu.  en in a second 
step she describes the speciﬁ cities in each of the leishu, and at the end provides a 
résumé of the elements in common and speciﬁ c diﬀ erences in the depiction of 
the individual senses in the two leishu.  e analysis of the leishu quotes is further 
divided into the categories of expression (Ausdruck) and reception (Aufnahme), 
which she makes out as two important aspects of diﬀ erentiation in the Chinese 
understanding of the senses. Further categories are vulnerability (Verletzlichkeit) 
and oddness (Merkwürdigkeit). Within this analytical framework Enzinger then 
cites a selection of anecdotes from the leishu to illustrate the semantic ﬁ eld associ-
ated with each of the senses. Since many of the quotes making up the entries on 
the senses can be found in both leishu, there is a great amount of overlapping 
deﬁ nitions. In the Taiping yulan, however, Enzinger discovers a conspicuous 
increase in the reference to violent situations to characterize the senses, which she 
explains by the disengagement of the Taiping yulan with poetic language (p. 182). 
 e conclusion of the second chapter is mainly a summary. One of the main 
results is the discovery that, in contrast to Western conceptions viewing the ﬁ ve 
senses as instruments through which information on the outside world can be 
gathered, the Chinese understand the senses as corresponding organs that are 
transferring mutual inﬂ uences between the inside and outside worlds (the things, 
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wu) of the human being.  e senses are conceptualized as mutually related carri-
ers of particular functions rather then as singular material entities. 
Enzinger notes two shifts in the historical understanding of the senses, one in 
Han and one in Tang times. Pre-Qin philosophy focused on the relationship of 
the Five Oﬃ  cers with one another and with the heart, and concentrated both on 
the regulative functions of the Oﬃ  cers to create order and on the receptive aspect 
of the senses. From Han times onwards, the expressive aspect of the senses for 
medical purposes, and from Tang times also for physiognomic purposes, becomes 
important as well. In the leishu a hierarchical order of the senses can be detected: 
the visual sense as well as speech appear to be dominant. Apart from these general 
insights the study yields a great number of details associated to the senses. 
More of these details are accessible through the annotated translation of the 
sense-related parts of the two leishu that forms the third part of the book (pp. 185-
280).  e footnotes give precise source references and sometimes provide the 
context of the quotations or philological discussions.  is third part provides a 
very comfortable overview of the leishu entries, of their speciﬁ c style, systematiza-
tion and coherence, which is highly valuable both as an introduction to leishu 
entries and to the topics discussed.  is completes a book which is an extremely 
helpful and comprehensive introduction to the complex ﬁ eld of Chinese notions 
of something similar to the European ﬁ ve senses and is based on the translation 
and analysis of a huge amount of primary source material. In this respect it realizes 
what it promised to do at the beginning. 
We do not ﬁ nd, however, much further theoretical reﬂ ection in the sense of 
cultural theory or comparative analysis.  e only comparative references provided 
are modern European notions of the ﬁ ve senses, which is always an uneven and 
unfair approach to classical Chinese notions and suggests cultural gaps which to 
a large extent reﬂ ect problems of historical displacement.  e book is thus not so 
much a comparative study than a pure sinological work whose strength lies in its 
presentation of a great range and wide spectrum of Chinese thoughts on the 
senses.  e historical contexts and sources of these thoughts are always indi -
cated, and at the end of the book there is a very helpful list of all the works cited 
in the leishu; but the historical dimension is weak in the analysis of the contents. 
 Enzinger focuses her analysis more on the attempt to ﬁ nd general commonalities 
in her highly diverse material and to boil the varieties down to some Chinese 
essential understanding of the senses that might be set in opposition to Western 
modern notions. She does not set up a historical perspective for the development 
of the manifold notions she discusses, nor does she try to systematize the rather 
diverse conceptions of senses within diﬀ erent systems of thought, as does for 
example Paul Unschuld in his Medicine in China: A History of Ideas,2 a book that 
appears in the bibliography at the end of the work. What we do not ﬁ nd in the 
bibliography is Chinese secondary literature on the subject: only Chinese primary 
2) Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988.
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sources and reference works are listed, and not a single study in Japanese. I  wonder 
why the author, who aims to explore the Chinese views, has not taken a look at 
the Chinese and Japanese discussions of the ﬁ eld and has restricted herself entirely 
to the Western discourse.  ere is a glossary, but no index. 
Despite these shortcomings, the great merit of this rich book is to provide the 
academic community with abundant primary source materials related to the 
senses, and thus to open the ﬁ eld to further research. Enzinger’s book is a ﬁ rst step 
into a ﬁ eld which is relevant not only for sinological research but also for disci-
plines like medicine, philosophy, cognitive science and cultural studies. As she 
herself writes at the end of her conclusion, some aspects of the Chinese ﬁ gures of 
thought may still be hidden to our understanding.  is study invites its readers 
to pursue the critical discussion.
Joachim Gentz, University of Edinburgh
